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The purpose of this research paper is to investigate whether there exist alterative methods ofexamining the
widespread nature of corruption in Russia. According to Transparency International’s most recently published
Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, Russia ranks 133 out of 176 countries and territories, indicating that
Russia’s public sector is perceived to be a corrupt as those of the Comoros, Guyana, Honduras, Iran, and
Kazakhstan. This paper advocates the view that what is currently needed most is not solutions or prescriptive
measures to curb such high levels of reported corruption in Russia. Rather, this paper seeks to ultimately gain
a better understanding of the conditions behind Russia’s consistently low-ranking with regards to its high
levels of perceived corruption. To achieve this aim, a method of examining corruption under the lens of
criminological theories is proposed. Corruption is defined as the acceptance of bribes in Russia’s civil service
system. Based on a review of relevant criminological theories and an examination of the supporting body of
academic literature, criminological theories deemed most applicable to the study of corruption in Russia’s civil
service system are rational choice theory, social control theory, and strain theory. In contrast, theories
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theory, and labeling theory. The paper ends by highlighting several areas that deserve further study in order to
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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this research paper is to investigate whether there exist alterative methods of 
examining the widespread nature of corruption in Russia. According to Transparency 
International’s most recently published Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, Russia ranks 133 out 
of 176 countries and territories, indicating that Russia’s public sector is perceived to be as 
corrupt as those of the Comoros, Guyana, Honduras, Iran, and Kazakhstan. This paper advocates 
the view that what is currently needed most is not solutions or prescriptive measures to curb such 
high levels of reported corruption in Russia. Rather, this paper seeks to ultimately gain a better 
understanding of the conditions behind Russia’s consistently low-ranking with regards to its high 
levels of perceived corruption. To achieve this aim, a method of examining corruption under the 
lens of criminological theories is proposed. Corruption is defined as the acceptance of bribes in 
Russia’s civil service system. Based on a review of relevant criminological theories and an 
examination of the supporting body of academic literature, criminological theories deemed most 
applicable to the study of corruption in Russia’s civil service system are rational choice theory, 
social control theory, and strain theory. In contrast, theories requiring further research before any 
direct applications can be established include critical theory, biological theory, and labeling 
theory. The paper ends by highlighting several areas that deserve further study in order to 
advance with this newly proposed method of examining corruption in Russia.  
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I. Introduction  
“Corruption in Russia is so pervasive that the whole society accepts the unacceptable as 
normal, as the only way of survival, as the way things ‘just are.’”1 As the aforementioned quote 
suggests, those who harbor the view that corruption is entrenched in Russia that many of its 
citizens have become so accustomed to a certain lawless way of life, certainly do not constitute a 
minority. According to Transparency International’s most recently published Corruption 
Perceptions Index 2012, Russia ranks 133 out of 176 countries and territories, scoring a mere 28 
points out of a total possible 100 points (with 0 meaning that a country is perceived to be highly 
corrupt and 100 indicating that a country is perceived to be very clean).2 Transparency 
International’s ranking signals that Russia’s public sector is perceived to be as corrupt as those of 
the Comoros, Guyana, Honduras, Iran, and Kazakhstan.3 Indeed, with Russia’s National Anti-
Corruption Committee estimating the nation’s corruption market to add up to approximately US$ 
300 billion per year (excluding distorted incentives and lost investments resulting from side 
effects4), with most of this money circulating in the public finance, natural resource, and state 
property industries, as put by Yelena Panfilova of Transparency International of Russia, 
“corruption is systematic, with plenty of unpunished criminals.”5 
Nonetheless, this is not to say that the nation has been largely inattentive with regards to 
alleviating such highly reported levels of perceived corruption within its borders. Recently, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Friedman, Misha. (2012), For Russians, Corruption Is Just A Way of Life. The New York Times. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/19/opinion/sunday/for-russians-corruption-is-just-a-way-of-life.html?_r=0 
2 Transparency International. (2012). Corruption Perceptions Index 2012. 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results 
3 Transparency International. (2012). Corruption Perceptions Index 2012. 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results 
4 Editors. (2013). Strongman Putin Is No Match for Corruption. Bloomberg. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-
05-07/strongman-putin-is-no-match-for-corruption.html 
5 Zagorodnov, Artem. (2013). Will Russia’s Anti-Corruption Campaign Improve the Business Climate? Russia 
Beyond The Headlines.  http://rbth.ru/society/2013/04/10/kickbacks_down_future_uncertain_24879.html 	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Russia implemented an amendment to Federal Law 273-FZ “On Counteracting Corruption” (or 
“the Anticorruption Law”) which it enacted in 2009, such that the legislation now requires 
affirmative anti-corruption compliance measures from all corporations organized in Russia.6 In 
effect, the amendment surpasses the reach and extent of both the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act and the U.K. Bribery Act in the sense that it requires all corporations to implement 
preventive measures that prohibit commercial bribery.7 The Russian government has also thus 
far implemented 15 of the 26 recommendations that the Council of Europe recommended in 
2008, a feat that has been praised by the Council’s Group of States Against Corruption (or 
“GRECO”).8 Furthermore, President Vladmir Putin has devoted much effort in advocating his 
anti-corruption campaign, commonly referred to as the “nationalization of the elite”, through 
which he is requiring state officials to submit their income and expenditure declarations, as well 
as divest their ownership of foreign shares, bank accounts, and other assets, giving bureaucrats a 
clear signal of new expectations and policies that ultimately require greater transparency.9 
Despite such well-intentioned initiatives, Russia has yet to produce tangible 
improvements. Aside from its steadily decreasing ranks on Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index since 1980, especially in comparison to its Socialist neighbors, 
recent poll results indicate otherwise.10 While the efficacy ratings for Putin and his anti-
corruption campaign have risen to 31 percent from 12 percent six years ago, with the ratings for 
the National Anti-Corruption Committee up to nine percent from three percent, and that for law 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Semins, William, & Yasinow, Denise N. (2013). Russia Amends Anti-Corruption Law to Require Affirmative 
Anti-Corruption Compliance Measures. K&L Gates LLC. http://www.klgates.com/russia-amends-anti-corruption-
law-to-require-affirmative-anti-corruption-compliance-measures-05-02-2013/ 
7 Brooks, Patricia J., & Trifonov, Ivan A. (2012). Anticorruption Laws of Russia. Retrieved from 
http://www.squiresanders.com/russias_anticorruption_laws_overview/ 
8 Editors. (2013). Strongman Putin Is No Match for Corruption. Bloomberg. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-
05-07/strongman-putin-is-no-match-for-corruption.html 
9 Bovt, Georgy. (2013). Putin’s Anti-Corruption Campaign: The Public Can Help. Telegraph. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/10028934/putin-anti-corruption-campaign.html 
10 Kleiner, V. (2012). Anticorruption Strategy of Business in Russia. Problems of Economic Transition, 55(2), 3-20. 
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enforcement agencies up to 17 percent from 12 percent, 38 percent of those polled have indicated 
that the campaign has not yet produced any significantly meaningful results.11 Furthermore, 13 
percent of those polled said that the level and extent of corruption have even worsened.12  
With such a context in mind, this paper advocates the view that what is currently needed 
most is not to come up with solutions or prescriptive measures to curb the high level of reported 
corruption in Russia. Rather, this paper takes a retrospective step backward and seeks to 
ultimately gain a better understanding of the conditions behind Russia’s consistently low-ranking 
with regards to its high levels of perceived corruption. To achieve this aim, a method of 
examining corruption under the lens of criminological theories is proposed, the details and 
results of which will be discussed throughout the later portions of this paper.  
 
II. The Perception of Corruption as a Crime 
There exist various definitions of corruption, but one of the more widely accepted 
definitions is as follows: the abuse or misuse of public office or trust for personal rather than 
public benefit.13 This definition by Nye is most apt as it includes the abuse of political, legal, 
and/or social power (as in holding a position in the civil service system) for personal, not public, 
gain. 
More specifically, the aforementioned Russia’s Anticorruption Legislation defines 
“corruption as a detriment to the lawful interests of the state and society, stemming from the 
following four dimensions: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ankov, Vitali. (2012). No Success Stories in Anti-Corruption Drive-Poll. Rianovosti. 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20121204/177909138.html 
12 Ankov, Vitali. (2012). No Success Stories in Anti-Corruption Drive-Poll. Rianovosti. 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20121204/177909138.html 
13 Nye, Joseph S. (1967). Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis. American Political 
Science Review, 61, 417-419. 
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1. An abuse of power or position of authority with respect both to public servants 
and government officials (Public Officials) and to officers holding a 
management position in a commercial or other private entity (a Corporate 
Officer); 
2. Giving a bribe to, or receiving a bribe by, a Public Official or a foreign 
official/official of a public international organization (a Foreign Public Official); 
3. Engaging in commercial bribery—i.e., giving a bribe to, or receiving a bribe by, 
a Corporate Officer; or 
4. Facilitating a bribe.”14 
The perception of corruption as a crime is certainly not new as well. Corruption has 
generally been recognized as a crime against greater society, otherwise known as white-collar 
crime. The United Nations Convention against Corruption, first initiated in 2000, makes this 
aforementioned point clear, acknowledging that corruption “undermines democracy and the rule 
of law, leads to violations of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life, and allows 
organized crime, terrorism, and other threats to human security to flourish”.15 
 
III. The Importance of Russia’s Civil Service System 
Whereas in Western countries the permanent personnel of the State are referred to as 
“civil servants”, those who primarily function as servants of the state and permanently remain so 
in service in Russia are referred to as “cadre”.16 Unlike ordinary civil servants, these personnel of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Brooks, Patricia J., & Trifonov, Ivan A. (2012). Anticorruption Laws of Russia. Retrieved from 
http://www.squiresanders.com/russias_anticorruption_laws_overview/ 
15 Please refer to http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf for 
the full text of the UN Convention against Corruption.	  
16 Aarrevaara, Timo. (1999). Restructuring Civil Service in Russian Public Administration. Helsinki Ministry of 
Finance: Public Management Department. 17(99), 1-59. 
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the Russian State are entitled to powers that far exceed the scope of their formal position, as an 
individual within a cadre has obligations inherent not only to his position at work, but also in his 
family life as well as when he is off duty.17 
As its Constitution calls for, there has been widespread support for a less centralized 
system in Russia. Russian society initially resembled more of a unified federalist system, in 
which the national bodies wield main power over the country’s strategic decisions relating to the 
economy, foreign policy, and defense and education.18 Eastern Europe’s gradual transition away 
from such a centralized model meant more power being granted to other levels of administration. 
Towards the end of the Soviet era, Russia’s administrative system was close to the district 
model, with the responsibility for basic services—particularly political and administrative 
potential—being largely dependent on the regional level and the city districts.19 In effect, civil 
servants became more crucial players in the country’s public sphere as administrative links 
between the national and local levels became weaker. 
 Especially regarding public administration systems such as that present in Russia in 
which civil servants wield considerable power, this paper makes the argument that the starting 
point for an honest system is the individual public servant. There “cannot be high-integrity 
organizations without high-integrity individuals”, and this means that public servants need to do 
the “right” thing, before the country’s civil service system and ultimately the nation itself, can 
become less contaminated by widespread levels of corruption.20 Hence, the examination of 
corruption for the purpose of this paper will center around Russia’s civil service system, and will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ohotsky, E.V. Lukyanenko, V.I. - Sulemov, V.A.: Gosudarstvennaya kadrovaya 
politika i mehanizm ee realizatsii. Izdatelstvo RAGS. Moskva, 1998. 
18 Evans, Alfred B., & Gel’man, Vladmir. (2004). The Politics of Local Government in Russia. Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
19 Aarrevaara, Timo. (1999). Restructuring Civil Service in Russian Public Administration. Helsinki Ministry of 
Finance: Public Management Department. 17(99), 1-59.	  
20 Dess, Gregory G., Theodore Peridis, and G. T. Lumpkin. 2006. Strategic Management: Creating Competitive 
Advantages, Canadian ed. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson. 
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be conducted from the perspective that each civil servant has the potential to act as an agent of 
corruption. As elaborated under the principal-agent model of corruption, the individual provides 
an apt starting point as corruption stems from the decisions that which individuals make.21 
 
IV. Purpose 
Unlike the majority of scholarly works published with regards to corruption, the purpose 
of our paper is not to attempt at coming up with potential solutions and policy recommendations 
that may help combat widespread corruption in Russia. We are not seeking to identify the 
specific causes of corruption in Russia, what has accounted for their persistent, more rapid 
growth relative to its peers in the Soviet bloc, and why this obstacle has proven to be so difficult 
to overcome. Although many papers have explored such areas, if we knew the correct answers to 
these questions, Russia would not have been attained such consistently low rankings on 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Further, polls would not have 
published fairly disappointing results, such as 38 percent admitting that Russia’s anti-corruption 
campaigns have yet to produce “meaningful” outcomes, and 13 percent pointing that “corruption 
keeps getting worse”.22 
Rather, the focus of this paper is to examine how criminological theories can be used to 
provide scholars with a new lens to studying corruption. Hopefully, the application of such 
theories will help scholars and policymakers better identify and understand more deeply the 
“real” causes of corruption in Russia, ultimately leading to more comprehensive, proactive, and 
effective policy changes and solutions.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Groenendijk, Nico. (1997). A Principal-Agent Model of Corruption. Crime, Law & Social Change, 27, 207-229.  
22 Ankov, Vitali. (2012). No Success Stories in Anti-Corruption Drive-Poll. Rianovosti. 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20121204/177909138.html 
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V. Question 
Given criminology’s long-standing history, the field encompasses a myriad of relevant 
criminological theories. Based on the existing academic literature published regarding this 
subject area, six most commonly mentioned and discussed criminological theories were 
identified, which are as follows (in no particularly significant order): 
• Biological theory 
• Critical theory 
• Labeling theory 
• Rational choice theory 
• Social control theory 
• Strain theory 
 
Hence, the main question driving this paper ultimately becomes the following: “Which of the six 
common criminological theories can be utilized to better understand for the widespread and 
entrenched nature of corruption in Russia, and to what extent?” 
 
VI. Methodology 
Considering the purpose of this research, it will inherently be more qualitative than 
quantitative, referencing published scholars’ works and determining which of the 
aforementioned six common criminological theories are most applicable to examining corruption 
in Russia. Hypothesis testing will take the form of “testing” each criminological theory and 
examining the relevant literature. Again, this paper will not take a normative approach in 
providing possible suggestions for policy implementations, but will instead provide the 
knowledge basis from which such policy solutions can hopefully, and ultimately, be derived. In 
effect, the paper will be a synthesis of various criminological theories, relevant scholarly articles, 
and a review of which theories might be most applicable. The paper will also end by suggesting 
10 
potential areas that deserve further study for the advancement of the proposed academic 
approach.  
 
VII. Application of Criminological Theories and Review of Relevant Findings 
Rational choice theory 
Rational choice theory, developed by Cornish and Clarke, stems from the “classical” 
ideas of Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham, who believed that humans based their decisions 
primarily on the search for pleasure and in ways to best leverage utility maximization, avoiding 
pain.23 Further elaborating on this idea is the viewpoint that crime is a choice that is influenced 
by a comparison and weighing of the costs and benefits associated with undertaking the criminal 
act—it’s “rationality”—hence the name of this theoretical approach.24 The decision to commit a 
crime will more likely be deterred if its costs are immediate, salient, and certain, with examples 
being subject to a greater degree punishment that would normally be expected to be imposed 
under such a situation, more effort being required, and being presented with increased chances of 
detection by regulatory authorities. This notion of comparing the relative merits of benefits 
versus costs has been detailed as a model by Dr. Nichols in “The Perverse Effect of Campaign 
Contribution Limits”, in which he presents the following model: 
nCcon > Cpsy + p(Ccrim + Csoc) + Cfav25 
where nCcon  represents benefit gained, Cpsy represents psychic costs, p represents the perceived 
probability of detection,  Ccrim represents the criminal sanctions, Csoc represents the social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Hayward, Keith. Situational Crime Prevention and its Discontents: Rational Choice Theory versus the ‘Culture of 
Now’. (2007). Social Policy & Administration, 41(3), 232-250.  
24 Agnew, Robert, & Cullen, Francis T. (2006). Criminological Theory: Past to Present.  Los Angeles: Roxbury 
Publishing Company.  
25 Nichols, Philip M. (2011). The Perverse Effect of Campaign Contribution Limits: Reducing the Allowable 
Amounts Increases the Likelihood of Corruption in the Federal Legislature. American Business Law Journal 48(1), 
77-118. 
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sanctions, and Cfav represents the cost of the favor. In other words, if the amount saved is greater 
than the cost, then the legislator will accept the bribe and act corruptly.  
Rational choice theory can be applied to civil servants in the aforementioned Russia’s 
cadre system. Corruption can be seen as an economic problem, as civil servants view bribes as an 
economic decision and use their full discretion to weigh the pros and cons, hence acting as 
potential agents of corruption.26 Particularly in Russia, the benefits of accepting a bribe outweigh 
its costs, taking into consideration the relative lack of punishments that would be imposed upon 
detected bribe takers. Although measures such as banning officials from owning foreign bank 
accounts or shares, or requiring top officials to declare their personal incomes have been 
proposed recently, the civil service system currently functions without an intensive system of 
checks and controls.27 Partially owing to the gaps in the Russian legislation and regulatory 
framework that still allow much leeway for the courts when defining the term “corruption”, in 
cases where officials are convicted of accepting bribes, they tend to receive only conditional 
sentences as the severe sentences are usually reserved for those officials who have openly 
criticized the authorities.28 Furthermore, although civil servants are strong advised against 
accepting gifts that cost more than 3,000 roubles, equivalent to approximately US$ 100, the law 
that prohibits servants from doing so has not yet led to any preventive results because the 
equivalent government resolution specifying what is a gift, how they should be handled, and by 
what authority, has not been detailed yet.29 Law enforcement efforts are crucial, since based on 
greater levels of perceived costs, more highly expected punishments should deter corruption, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Rose-Ackerman, Susan. (1999). Corruption and Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
27 Fedorenko, Vladimir. (2013). Corrupting Language: Russian Officials Banned from Bribe-inducing Phrases. RIA 
Novosti. http://rt.com/politics/russia-bans-corrupt-language-893/ 
28 IM Russia. (2013). Corruption in Russia as a Business. Institute of Modern Russia. 
http://imrussia.org/en/society/376-corruption-in-russia-as-a-business 
29 Alexandrova, Lyudmila. (2013). Russian Civil Servants Taught to Be Honest. Russia & India Report. 
http://indrus.in/politics/2013/03/14/russian_civil_servants_taught_to_be_honest_22915.html 
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this high probability of detection can only be accomplished if these penalties are guaranteed, 
established, and promised.30 Combined with low basic salary levels, Russia’s civil service 
system not only limits the entry of young professionals into the nation’s civil service, but also 
significantly increases the range and magnitude of benefits that civil servants can expect to 
derive from accepting bribes when they compare the benefits and costs of their action as per the 
rational choice theory.31 Such is the case to the extent where one of the more commonly 
proposed solutions to curbing corruption Russia is to increase the salaries of civil servants, so 
that the potential “profit margin” that civil servants can derive from accepting bribes is 
effectively reduced, meaning that the benefits will less likely outweigh the costs in the civil 
servant’s rational thinking process.32 
 
Social control theory 
 Social control theory focuses on the strategies and institutions that control the scope of 
behavior, such as the influence of families, schools, and moral systems that lead to compliance 
with the rules of society.33  In other words, individuals are less likely to commit crimes if it were 
not for the controls and restrictions that society places on them. As once expressed by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the weakness, inefficiency, and 
corruption of all branches of government are the most important obstacles to further progress in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Rose-Ackerman, Susan. (1999). Corruption and Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
31 Hardt, John P. (2002). Russia’s Uncertain Economic Future: With a Comprehensive Subject Index. M.E. Sharpe, 
Inc. 
32 Petro, Nicolai N. (2013). Open Government Initiatives and Increasing Civil Servants Salaries Will Help Fight 
Corruption in Russia-Expert. The Voice of Russia. http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_02_12/Open-government-initiatives-
and-increasing-civil-servants-salaries-will-help-fight-corruption-in-Russia-expert/ 
33 Agnew, Robert, & Cullen, Francis T. (2006). Criminological Theory: Past to Present.  Los Angeles: Roxbury 
Publishing Company. 
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reforming Russia.34 Social control theory can be applied in coordination with the view that the 
chief obstacle barring Russia from achieving similar levels of success with the highly developed 
nations of the West is its criminally corrupt state system, in which vital resources have been 
reallocated from groups supportive of the modernization of society to those in the conservative 
higher ranks prioritizing personal enrichment.35 Additionally, the recent period of change in 
Eastern Europe has led to the disintegration of formal structures, and the lack of understanding of 
public administration principles has hindered bureaucratic development in post-Soviet societies. 
This has resulted in loyalty to other members of the organization being as important, or more 
important, than good administration.36  
 As was briefly alluded to when discussing rational choice theory, the influential control 
imposed by relevant legislative frameworks cannot be ignored. The deterrent effect of 
anticorruption laws is potentially unbounded, as the prevention of criminal behavior can be seen 
as a function of the probability of detection of the criminal act of paying and/or accepting a 
bribe, as well as the intensity of the punishment and penalties, particularly those imposed by the 
legal system.37 Again, strong law enforcement can exist only if there is a substantial legislative 
framework that supports such efforts. Gaps in the Russian legislation and regulatory framework 
allow much freedom for the courts when defining the term “corruption”, and in cases where 
officials are convicted of accepting bribes, they tend to receive only conditional sentences as the 
severe sentences are usually reserved for those officials who have openly criticized the 
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authorities.38 This relatively “soft” approach to punishing those to accept bribes is similar to 
those countries in which the briber is viewed as the “active” party and the public official as 
“passive”, whereby bribe recipients are treated more leniently than bribe payers.39 Law 
enforcement efforts are crucial, since based on the higher level of perceived costs, more highly 
expected punishments should to deter corruption, but this high probability of detection can only 
be accomplished if these penalties are guaranteed, established, and promised via an effective and 
imposing social control infrastructure.40 
 
Strain theory 
General strain theory posits that individuals experience strain when they cannot obtain 
success goals such as respected status in society and/or money, and that under certain conditions 
they are likely to respond to such cases of strain with criminal behavior, especially when the 
strain results in a negative effect as anger and frustration.41 According to Robert Agnew, who 
founded general strain theory by addressing weaknesses in the prior approaches to strain theory 
undertaken by scholars such as Cohen, Coward, and Olin, there are three types of strain, which 
he outlines as follows42: 
1. Failure to achieve positively valued stimuli 
2. Loss of a positively valued stimuli 
3. Presentation of a negative stimuli 
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The failure of achieve positively valued stimuli include an individual’s inability to secure 
positively favored goals which members of society strive, which Agnew points out are money, 
status and respect, and autonomy.43 Examples of loss of positively valued stimuli include broken 
relationships with a partner, or the theft of valued object; similarly, examples of presentation of 
negative stimuli encompass homelessness, negative school experiences, and adverse relations 
with peers.44 
Strain theory may prove to be especially useful when examining the inner workings of 
Russia’s civil service system. Strain theory assumes that most individuals have similar 
aspirations as determined by societal norms of values, but unfortunately enough, not everyone is 
exposed to the same set of opportunities or abilities. When people fail to achieve society’s 
expectations through normally approved means such as hard work and good work ethic, they 
may attempt to achieve success through crime. Truly qualified civil servants may fail to achieve 
society’s expectations—which, in this case, would be money—through means such as hard work 
and good work ethic stemming from innate intelligence and a morally virtuous mindset. 
However, despite their efforts, such individuals may still feel inferior to those who are less 
qualified but receive better end results through the acceptance of bribes and other shortcuts. Pay 
for civil servants has fallen in many countries relative not only to private sector wages but also to 
civil service pay in the past, a pattern which prevails in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union.45 If public sector pay is low, corruption is a survival strategy, as in such cases officials 
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are more likely to accept payoffs as salary supplements.46 According to strain theory, this will 
lead to a sort of chain reaction in which more and more civil servants are inclined to resort to 
bribery to get ahead of the game as they see their peers succeeding more in achieving “positively 
valued stimuli” as money, independent of their qualifications and work ethic. If government-
determined pay scales do not reward those with the necessary qualifications through a justified 
salary, skilled servants will resort to accepting bribes to cope with this strain and discrepancy in 
pay level. At the same time, as the skilled workers who choose to leave the well-faring but less 
qualified civil servants behind, a labor market equilibrium emerges in which those who possess 
low skills will be concentrated in low-paid government jobs that they are not qualified to 
perform.47 
 
VIII. Discussion of Findings 
Again, the purpose of this paper is not to provide solutions, but rather to provide scholars 
with a new lens through which they can study corruption. Based on the findings above, three out 
of the aforementioned six commonly discussed criminological theories are deemed to be most  
applicable to the study of corruption in Russia’s civil service system: 
• Rational choice theory 
• Social control theory 
• Strain theory 
 
In contrast, less emphasis is given to the following three remaining theories: 
• Biological theory 
• Critical theory 
• Labeling theory 
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 Biological theories trace back to Lombroso, who posited that the “Atavistic man”, or the 
“born criminal”, would encounter frictions against civilized society. In short, the biological 
theory of criminology views criminal behavior as a result of a defect in the individual’s genetic 
makeup.48 The body of influential research on the biological bases of criminal behavior has 
grown rapidly, with substantial relationships being established between crime and 
psychopathology.49 Nonetheless, the existence of evidence that extends this relationship directly 
to the behavior of civil servants in Russia has yet to exist. 
Critical theory posits that inequality in material well-being and power leads to conditions 
that ultimately result in crime. Much of the theory centers around the viewpoint that capitalism 
and the market economy have created many sources of inequality that have provided 
opportunities for the powerful to exploit the less-privileged and impoverished.50 While this 
theory may not pose any obviously direct applications to the rationale behind why Russian civil 
servants choose to accept bribes as do the rational choice, social control, and strain theories well 
explain, critical theory does bring up a few interesting areas of thought with respect to the market 
economy’s role in providing a basis upon which corruption spread in Russia. 
 When the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, most Western economists expected 
a relatively quick transition from central planning to a market-based economy via the standard 
prescription known as the “shock therapy”, which consisted of four central components—“price 
decontrol, a stable currency, hard budget constraints on state-owned firms, and the rapid 
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privatization of state-owned enterprises.”51 However, the transition had been much slower than 
expected, and with disappointing results—Russia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dropped 
between 1991 and 1998, with the nation’s GDP in 2000 being at only 64 percent of its level in 
1990; income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient increased from 0.26 to 0.47; and 
around US$ 200 worth of capital fled, and investment in Russia plummeted.52 Such outcomes are 
not entirely surprising, as Soviet market conditions are inherently different from the economic 
management systems of the Western countries, with regards to elements such as extent of 
administrative regulation of economic activity and the degree of restriction placed on non-state 
economic activity.53 The Russian economy can be characterized by a mixed system with both 
market and bureaucratic elements, which has led to regional protectionism and localism.54 
Hence, values of the Soviet Economy entail views such as protecting family and friends, 
avoiding risk from strangers, relying on personal trust, and relying on the government for jobs, 
which starkly contrast from market economy values, which include protecting and facilitating 
transactions with strangers, relying on generalized trust that involves interaction with foreign 
institutions and strangers, and relying on the private sector for jobs.55 Trying to implement a 
market-oriented economy, without the necessary social infrastructure thoroughly developed and 
implemented, especially when the values upheld by the Russians differ from those that constitute 
the typical Western market economy, may have possibly led to the spread of corruption and the 
prevalence of bribery in a market economy that has literally gone wild. 
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Not much substantial evidence exists to support the application of labeling theory to 
examining corruption in Russia’s civil service system. Labeling theory explains that individuals 
are more likely to engage themselves in criminal behavior and become “stabilized” in criminal 
roles when they are labeled as a criminal, are sent to prison, become stigmatized, and are 
excluded from participating in conventional roles that would commonly be expected in society. 56 
If labeling theory were to be applicable to our situation of interest, there needs to exist evidence 
that a substantial proportion of bribe acceptors are indeed being labeled as criminals and are 
becoming stigmatized, and that such convicted civil servants have chosen to accept bribes 
constantly again because they now see themselves as criminals. However, as alluded to earlier, 
such a scenario cannot be true, as the prevalence of civil servants’ accepting bribes may be 
attributed to the current lack of imposing punishments and social controls, which has actually 
resulted in a smaller number of such individuals being sentenced under severe sentences.57  
 
IX. Areas Deserving Further Study 
As much as the application of criminological theories may prove to be a novel way of 
studying corruption in Russia’s civil service system, there exist several key areas that deserve 
further attention.  
Most notable is the phenomenon known as the “Putin team”. Putin has allegedly selected 
those in his vicinity to be included in his inner circle of policymakers and influential power 
holders. A study conducted in last year suggests that several of Putin’s friends have succeeded in 
becoming wealthy in recent years, having made their fortunes through deals that have involved 
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government.58 A plausible argument that can be withdrawn from this “Putin effect” is that an 
expectation of corruption, and hence an evasive culture that deems corrupt acts acceptable, 
spreads throughout Russia’s political system as the nation’s own President does not denounce 
such acts himself. Based on this entrenched culture of corruption, individuals placed in the lower 
ranks of the nation’s social ladder, such as civil servants, are provided with no reason on which 
to act morally otherwise, illustrating a top-down diffusion of corruption throughout the nation’s 
societal sphere. Whilst criminologists may argue that crime and corruption tend to spread in a 
top-down vertical manner, it is yet unclear as to which of the aforementioned six common 
criminological theories can fully account for this “Putin effect”. 
Another consideration is that this paper has examined how individual criminological 
theories can be applied to study the widespread nature of corruption Russia’s civil service 
system, in effect assuming that such theories act in a sort of mutually exclusive manner. 
However, it is indeed possible that the phenomenon can also be examined from the interaction of 
multiple such criminological theories. Which theories, and to which extent their interaction, 
account for corruption in Russia, poses an interesting area for further research and exploration. 
On a broader level, it is also worth considering whether it is appropriate to be applying 
these Western-based criminological theories, to describe a phenomenon that belongs to a foreign 
country. A country’s unique system of values are so deeply ingrained that any foreign disruption 
is likely to result in an inharmonious clash of ideals and the renouncement to let go of one’s own 
beliefs. Hence, it is possible that some may question the feasibility of applying the 
aforementioned six criminological theories to elements of Russia’s own civil service system, and 
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the occurrence of corruption within that nation only. 
   
X. Conclusion 
Corruption is a widely studied topic, yet solutions that have been proposed in the past 
have yet to achieve much tangible, progressive reform in Russia. By applying criminological 
theories to this area of study, it is hoped that this complex issue will be made more 
understandable and easier to approach, thereby effectively providing an unprecedented lens 
through which scholars and policymakers can examine corruption in Russia. More importantly, 
the results of such an approach will entail crucial implications for policymaking, particularly 
with regards to the nation’s civil service system and the role of the cadre acting as potential 
agents for corruption within the State. The application of criminological theories may not 
necessarily lead to immediate solutions. However, the proposed methodology, in conjunction 
with the aforementioned areas that at this point deserve further study, will nevertheless prove to 
be a progressive start. 	  
